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It has been consistently demonstrated that
people tend to perform more poorly on
subsequent self-control tasks after com-
pleting an initial task that requires them
to exert self-control (Hagger et al., 2010;
Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2014). The
predominant explanation of such deple-
tion effect claims that self-control taxes
a limited resource that becomes drained
with use (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000).
Inzlicht and colleagues recently chal-
lenged the resource model by question-
ing the necessity and sufficiency of the
resource metaphor for explaining self-
control (Inzlicht et al., 2014). Instead,
they presented a non-resource based pro-
cess model. According to this model, self-
control failure due to initial exertion is less
about resource depletion but more about
the motivated switching of task priorities
from “have-to” and labor goals to “want-
to” and leisure goals. We applaud such
advance as the new account not only is
evolutionarily and biologically more plau-
sible but also can accommodate recent
findings that are incompatible with the
resource model (Inzlicht and Schmeichel,
2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014). However, we
argue that the motivation-shift mecha-
nism emphasized by the process model
alone is not sufficient for explaining self-
control depletion. A parallel cognitive
adaptation mechanism must also be taken
into account.
From a cognitive control perspective,
the depletion effect is nothing mysterious
but can be considered as a phenomenon
similar to “switch costs” (Kiesel et al.,
2010). The cognitive system is evolved to
be able to actively adapt to given demands
and buffer against situational changes.
However, the inevitable cost is a reduced
flexibility to promptly switch to a new
demand. In a situation requiring consec-
utive exertion of effort, the control pro-
cesses being recruited to adapt to the first
self-control task would linger and hinder
adaptation to the subsequent self-control
task that requires different control pro-
cesses (Botvinick et al., 2001; Dewitte et al.,
2009). For example, if a dieting person is
asked to control intake of palatable but
unhealthy food after having performed
emotion regulation, the recruitment of
control processes for resisting temptation
would be impeded as the control system is
still geared toward regulating emotions.
The first implication of this reconcep-
tualization is that engaging in a first self-
control task could facilitate, rather than
impair, self-control success in the second
task when these two tasks require simi-
lar control processes because the control
processes needed in the second task are
already activated, as both experimental
studies (Dewitte et al., 2009) and ecolog-
ical momentary assessment (EMA) studies
(O’Connell et al., 2008) have attested.
The second implication is that even if
the control processes on which the two
consecutive tasks rely are different, allow-
ing respondents sufficient time to adapt to
the task demands would cancel the deple-
tion effect. Consistent with this implica-
tion, recent research showed that adapting
to either the first task (Dang et al., 2013)
or the second task (Barutchu et al., 2013)
removed the depletion effect without rest
or additional motivation. Further, there
was also evidence showing a negative cor-
relation between the adaptation level and
the depletion effect even when the time for
adaptation was limited, such that the more
respondents adapted to the first task, the
less errors they made on the second task
(Dang et al., 2013).
The third implication suggests fac-
tors that can reduce switch costs would
help to overcome self-control depletion.
It has been demonstrated that posi-
tive affect, which could enhance flexi-
bility of switching to new cognitive sets
by directing attention to novel informa-
tion (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004), suc-
cessfully neutralized the depletion effect
(Wenzel et al., 2013). In the meantime,
preparation is also critical for attenuating
switch cost (Kiesel et al., 2010). Studies
have shown that adapting to a series of
self-control tasks could counterintuitively
offset the depletion effect because the
requirement of continuous exertion would
help respondents get more prepared for
switching to the following demanding task
(Converse and Deshon, 2009; Xiao et al.,
in press).
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Since these findings can hardly be
reconciled with the motivation-shift
mechanism, we argue that the cognitive
adaptation mechanism addresses another
unique feature of self-control depletion
and parallels the motivation-shift mecha-
nism. Finding out how these two processes
interact with each other during consecu-
tive exertion is an important question for
future research. We suggest both the inter-
ference of the lingered control processes
after initial exertion and the decreased
motivation to engage in further effortful
work contribute to impaired performance
on the subsequent task. At the same time,
there is also a competition between the
adaptation process and the motivational
process such that successful adaptation,
either to the initial or to the following
task, would gradually reduce the role of
motivation-shift as adaptation attenu-
ates the aversiveness of effort exertion
that necessitates the motivated switching
of task priorities (Inzlicht et al., 2014),
thus helping to overcome self-control
depletion without recurring to additional
motivation.
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